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MUNICIPAL LAW-How BROAD A REMEDY? MUNICIPAL LIA­
BILITY AND THE MASSACHUSETTS CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 
INTRODUCTION 
Jane and Lena both live in Massachusetts, where, in identical 
situations, each was threatened with arrest for lawful activity in vio­
lation of her civil rights. Afterward, both filed lawsuits against the 
individuals who made the threat, as well as the individuals' employ­
ers. Jane's suit was successful. The individual perpetrator was judg­
ment-proof, but the employer paid damages. After paying the 
damages, the employer implemented a new training program to 
prevent future employee violations. 
Lena was also awarded damages, but she never received a 
dime. The individual was judgment-proof, and her case against the 
employer was dismissed before trial. The employer made no 
changes to training or supervision to prevent future incidents. 
What caused the different outcomes on nearly identical facts? 
In Jane's case, the employee was a security guard who worked for a 
private employer, while in Lena's case, the employee was a police 
officer employed by a municipal corporation. 
Did the Massachusetts legislators who passed the Massachu­
setts Civil Rights Act (MCRA)l in 1979 intend such disparate out­
comes? Is it possible that they were concerned only with the 
prejudice of private individuals and did not wish to provide incen­
tives for cities and towns to protect the civil rights of all Massachu­
setts citizens? This Note argues that the answer to both questions is 
no: the legislature intended to pass a bill that would provide protec­
tions for the civil rights of Massachusetts citizens in as broad a 
range of settings as possible, including settings in which the em­
ployer is a municipal entity. Specifically, this Note argues that mu­
nicipal corporations should be treated as any other "persons," 
subject to the same liability, including respondeat superior liability, 
as individuals and non-municipal employers under the MCRA, and 
that such a reading is consistent with the Act's intended purpose. 
Part I of this Note explores the historical background of the 
MCRA, beginning with an exploration of 42 U.S.c. § 1983 (§ 1983), 
1. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 12, §§ llH, 111 (2004). 
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the federal civil rights act on which the MCRA was modeled.2 A 
brief overview of the legislative history of § 1983 is followed by a 
discussion of § 1983 case law, culminating with the 1978 Supreme 
Court decision, Monell v. Department ofSocial Services.3 The Note 
then addresses the legislative history of the MCRA and case law 
relevant to a discussion about whether the word "person," as used 
in the MCRA, includes municipalities. 
Part II of this Note analyzes the competing considerations at 
play when determining legislative intent and argues that the Massa­
chusetts state and federal district courts have erred in entirely ex­
cluding municipalities from the reach of the MCRA. Excluding 
municipalities from the reach of the MCRA deprives some plain­
tiffs of a remedy available to other plaintiffs-damages from the 
employer of an employee who violated the plaintiff's civil rights 
while on the job. A further result is that municipalities have less 
liability for the civil rights violations committed by their employees 
than do private employers and, therefore, less financial incentive to 
ensure that employees are properly trained and supervised to avoid 
violations. Although municipalities are liable under § 1983, they 
are generally not subject to vicarious liability for the acts of em­
ployees.4 As a result, the harms of excluding municipalities from 
the reach of the MCRA are not remedied by the existence of lim­
ited federal liability for municipalities. 
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND ON FEDERAL AND 

STATE CIVIL RIGHTS LEGISLATION 

A. Brief Overview of the Legislative History of 42 U.S.c. § 1983 
The history of the MCRA begins with 42 U.S.c. § 1983. The 
core statutory language of § 1983 was originally passed as part of 
the Ku Klux Act, now also called the Civil Rights Act of 1871.5 As 
the original title suggests, the Act was passed in response to the 
racially motivated violence for which the Ku Klux Klan was 
known.6 The first section of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, since 
2. Id. 
3. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). 
4. See infra notes 56-58 and accompanying text. 
5. James J. Park, The Constitutional Tort Action as Individual Remedy, 38 HARV. 
c.R.-c.L. L. REV. 393, 410 (2003). 
6. 1 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, STATUTORY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: CIVIL 
RIGHTS 591 (Bernard Schwartz ed., 1970). 
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codified as § 1983,7 permitted a person who had been deprived of 
his or her civil rights "under color of any law" to bring suit in fed~ 
eral court against the person who had caused the deprivation.8 
This new civil cause of action complemented the existing fed~ 
eral criminal penalty for civil rights violations, thus providing a 
remedy for victims even where local law enforcement refused to 
act.9 After little debate, section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 
7. An Act to Enforce the Provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Consti­
tution of the United States and for Other Purposes, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (1871) (codi­
fied as amended at 42 U.S.c. § 1983 (2000». Other sections of the Civil Rights Act of 
1871 have been codified. Section 2 is codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 241 (2000) and 
42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (2000); section 6 is codified as amended at 42 U.S.c. § 1986 (2000). 
8. The text of section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 (Ku Klux Klan Act) 
provided: 
That any person who, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, 
custom, or usage of any State, shall subject, or cause to be subjected, any per­
son within the jurisdiction of the United States to the deprivation of any rights, 
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution of the United States, 
shall, any such law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of the 
State to the contrary notwithstanding, be liable to the party injured in any 
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress; such pro­
ceeding to be prosecuted in the several district or circuit courts of the United 
States, with and subject to the same rights of appeal, review upon error, and 
other remedies provided in like cases in such courts, under the provisions of 
the act of the ninth of April, eighteen hundred and sixty-six, entitled "An act 
to protect all persons in the United States in their civil rights, and to furnish 
the means of their vindication"; and the other remedial laws of the United 
States which are in their nature applicable in such cases. 
An Act to Enforce the Provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of 
the United States and for Other Purposes, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (1871) (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000». 
9. Section 2 of The Civil Rights Act of 1866 provided: 
That any person who, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or 
custom, shall subject, or cause to be subjected, any inhabitant of any State or 
Territory to the deprivation of any right secured or protected by this act, or to 
different punishment, pains or penalties on account of such person having at 
any time been held in a condition of slavery or involuntary servitude, except as 
a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, or 
by reason of his color or race, than is prescribed for the punishment of white 
persons, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and, on conviction, shall be 
punished by fine not exceeding one thousand dollars, or imprisonment not 
exceeding one year, or both, in the discretion of the court. 
Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 2, 14 Stat. 27 (1866). Similar language is now codified 
at 18 U.S.c. § 242. The introductory language was clearly the source for the analogous 
language in section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871. See supra note 5. However, the 
rights protected in 1866, prior to the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment, were 
based in the statute itself, rather than the Constitution. 
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was passed as introduced.lO There was, however, considerable de­
bate about various versions of section 6 of the Civil Rights Act of 
1871, especially the Sherman Amendment.!! Those debates have 
fueled judicial disagreement about the interpretation of the word 
"person" in § 1983.12 
Under Senator Sherman's proposed amendment, all residents 
of a "county, city, or parish" were made liable for damages caused 
by "any persons riotously and tumultuously assembled."13 The 
Senate approved the Sherman Amendment, but the House of Rep­
resentatives rejected it.!4 Later, the Conference Committee dis­
seminated a revised version that would have made the "county, city, 
or parish" itself liable for the damages.!5 Legislators in the House 
gave significant attention to the Conference Committee version of 
the Sherman Amendment before, again, rejecting it.16 Ultimately, 
Congress adopted section 6 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, which 
allowed suits against those who had power and knowledge but 
failed to act to prevent civil rights violations.17 As revised, section 6 
made individuals with the ability to prevent civil rights violations 
liable for any violations that occurred, and eliminated the type of 
collective liability suggested by Senator Sherman.18 In 1961, the Su­
preme Court ruled that the rejection of the second version of the 
Sherman Amendment showed that the legislature did not intend 
municipalities to be liable under the Civil Rights Act of 1871.19 In 
1978, however, the Supreme Court revisited the meaning of the de­
10. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 665-66 (1978) (citing 
CONGo GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 522); see also Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171 
(1961) (citing CONGo GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 568). 
11. For a thorough discussion of the Sherman Amendment, its sources, and the 
debate surrounding its adoption, see Russell Glazer, Note, The Sherman Amendment: 
Congressional Rejection o/Communal Liability For Civil Rights Violations, 39 U.c.L.A. 
L. REv. 1371,1394-1406 (1992). 
12. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 188-91. 
13. CONGo GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 663 (1871). 
14. Glazer, supra note 11, at 1401 (citing CONGo GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 663). 
15. Id. (citing CONGo GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 663, 707, 725). 
16. Id. at 1402 n.161, 1403. 
17. Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22, § 6, 17 Stat. 13, 15 (1871) (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.c. § 1986 (2000». Specifically, section 6 allowed suits, brought 
within a year, against a "person or persons, [who] having knowledge that any of the 
wrongs conspired to be done ... [was] about to be committed, and having power to 
prevent or aid in the preventing of same neglect or refuse so to do." [d. 
18. [d. 
19. Monroe V. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 172-83 (1961); see also infra notes 35-41 and 
accompanying text. 
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bate about the Sherman Amendment, and came to a different 
conclusion.20 
B. Interpreting § 1983: Monroe and Monell 
In Monroe v. Pape, the plaintiffs brought suit against the City 
of Chicago and a group of its police officers alleging that the of­
ficers violated their civil rights guaranteed under the United States 
Constitution.21 The complaint alleged that in the early hours of the 
morning, a group of thirteen Chicago police officers, acting without 
a warrant, entered their apartment, woke them and their children, 
and made them stand naked in their living room.22 The officers 
proceeded to "ransack[ ] every room, emptying drawers and ripping 
mattress covers. "23 One of the plaintiffs, Mr. Monroe, claimed he 
was held at the police station for ten hours without access to an 
attorney and with no opportunity to call his family, in further viola­
tion of his civil rights.24 The district court dismissed the claims 
against the city and the officers, holding that § 1983 was not vio­
lated because the officers' actions were illegal and therefore not 
carried out "under color of" state law.25 
When the district court entered its ruling, case law interpreting 
the phrase "under color of state law" limited application of the stat­
ute to challenges of written policies that, on their face, violated in­
dividuals' federal rights.26 The Supreme Court had, however, 
rejected a similarly narrow interpretation of the same phrase used 
in a criminal context in 18 U.S.c. § 242.27 Under § 242, state of­
20. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658,664-83 (1978); see also 
infra notes 55-58 and accompanying text. 
21. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 168-69. 
22. /d. at 169. 
23. Id. 
24. Id. 
25. Id. at 170. 
26. Marshall S. Shapo, Constitutional Tort: Monroe v. Pape, and the Frontiers Be­
yond, 60 Nw. U. L. REV. 277, 283-84 (1965) (noting that Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 
(1939); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927); and Myers v. Anderson, 238 U.S. 368 
(1915) all involved acts by officials enforcing unconstitutional state laws). 
27. United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941) (finding, in a criminal case, 
that "[m]isuse of power, possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only be­
cause the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law, is action taken under 
color of state law"). 18 U.S.c. § 242 reads in full: 
Whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, 
willfully subjects any person in any State, Territory, Commonwealth, Posses­
sion, or District to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities se­
cured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or to 
different punishments, pains, or penalties, on account of such person being an 
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ficers are presumed to have acted "under color of" state law, even if 
their activities violated state law, so long as their "possession of 
some state authority" facilitated their illegal acts.28 In Monroe, the 
Court adopted that interpretation of § 1983, explaining that both 
§ 1983 and § 242 took the phrase "under color of" state law from 
the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and, therefore, the "phrase should be 
accorded the same construction in both statutes. "29 The Court also 
noted that the legislature had ample time to reword either statute in 
the years since the phrase was given an expansive meaning under 18 
U.S.c. 	§ 242.30 
Thus, Monroe enabled plaintiffs to bring suit against govern­
ment officers whose actions did not comply with state law. How­
ever, Monroe also made it more difficult for some victims to get 
relief. After adopting a broader definition of "under color of state 
law," the Supreme Court went on to narrow the meaning of the 
word "person" as used in § 1983, holding that municipalities were 
not "persons" who could be sued under the statute.31 As a result, 
Monroe made it impossible for plaintiffs to sue a municipal govern­
ment directly under § 1983, even if employees acting in the course 
of their employment caused the civil rights violation.32 
alien, or by reason of his color, or race, than are prescribed for the punishment 
of citizens, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than one 
year, or both; and if bodily injury results from the acts committed in violation 
of this section or if such acts include the use, attempted use, or threatened use 
of a dangerous weapon, explosives, or fire, shall be fined under this title or 
imprisoned not more than ten years, or both; and if death results from the acts 
committed in violation of this section or if such acts include kidnapping or an 
attempt to kidnap, aggravated sexual abuse, or an attempt to commit aggra­
vated sexual abuse, or an attempt to kill, shall be fined under this title, or 
imprisoned for any term of years or for life, or both, or may be sentenced to 
death. 
18 U.S.c. § 242 (2000). Section 242 is derived from the second section of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1866 and, as noted by Justice Douglas in Monroe, the "under color of any 
law" language is identical to the language in § 1983. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 185. 
28. Home Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278, 288-89 (1913) 
(defining "state action" as used in the Fourteenth Amendment). The definition was 
applied to 18 U.S.C. § 242 in United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941). The correla­
tion between the interpretation of "state action" and "under color of state law" was 
explicitly noted by the Supreme Court when it decided United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 
787, 794 n.7 (1966). 
29. 	 Monroe, 365 U.S. at 185. 
30. 	 Id. at 186-87 (quoting Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945». 
31. Id. at 190-92 (permitting suit against individual police officers but dismissing 
claims made directly against the city for whom the officers worked). 
32. Harold F. McCart, Jr., Case Note, Damages May Be Recovered From a Police 
Officer Who Conducts an Unlawful Search and Seizure, 12 MERCER L. REv. 410, 412 
(1961) (evaluating the impact of Monroe). 
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Writing for the Court, Justice Douglas interpreted the word 
"person" in light of the debates about the second version of the 
Sherman Amendment,33 and the ultimate adoption of different lan­
guage in section 6.34 According to Douglas, the rejection of the 
Sherman Amendment showed that a majority in Congress was 
against making municipalities liable for deprivations of civil rights 
occurring within their borders.35 Because "[t]he response of the 
Congress to the proposal to make municipalities liable ... was so 
antagonistic," Justice Douglas concluded "we cannot believe that 
the word 'person' was used in [§ 1983] to include 
[municipalities]."36 
In addition to relying on the Sherman Amendment debates, 
the Court could have looked to An Act prescribing the Form of the 
enacting and resolving Clauses of Acts and Resolutions of Con­
gress, and Rules for the Construction thereof (hereinafter Federal 
Dictionary Act).37 The Federal Dictionary Act, which was adopted 
just months before the Civil Rights Act of 1871, established defini­
tions for words used in federal laws.38 Under the Act, the defini­
tion of "person" "extend[ed] and ... appl[ied] to bodies politic and 
corporate."39 Since municipalities, also known as municipal corpo­
rations,40 are both political and corporate bodies and § 1983 applies 
equally to all persons, adoption of the Act's definition of "person" 
would have subjected municipalities and individuals to the same lia­
bility under § 1983.41 
33. See supra notes 11-18 and accompanying text. 
34. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 188-91. 
35. Id. 
36. Id. at 191. 
37. An Act prescribing the Form of the enacting and resolving Clauses of Acts 
and Resolutions of Congress, and Rules for the Construction thereof, ch. 71, 16 Stat. 
431 (1871) (current version at 1 U.S.c. § 1 (2000)) [hereinafter Federal Dictionary Act). 
Congress adopted a revised set of definitions in 1947. General Provisions, ch. 388, § 1, 
61 Stat. 633, 633 (1947); Rules of Construction for Acts of Congress, ch. 645, § 6, 62 
Stat. 859 (1948). Currently "the words 'person' and 'whoever' include corporations, 
companies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies, as 
well as individuals." 1 U.S.c. § 1 (2000). 
38. The Federal Dictionary Act, ch. 71, 16 Stat. 431, was enacted February 25, 
1871, and the Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (codified as amended at 18 
U.S.c. §§ 241-42, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000)), was enacted April 20, 1871. 
39. Ch. 71, 16 Stat. 431 (1871). 
40. A municipality is a municipal corporation or "[t]he governing body of a mu­
nicipal corporation." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1043 (8th ed. 2004). A municipal cor­
poration is, in turn, "a city, town, or other local political entity." Id. at 1042. 
41. Indeed this was the conclusion reached by the Supreme Court when it de­
cided Monell v. Department of Social Services ofNew York, 436 U.S. 658, 688-89 (1978). 
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But the Federal Dictionary Act, Justice Douglas argued, 
"merely [provided] an allowable, not a mandatory" definition for 
the word "person. "42 In other words, the Federal Dictionary Act 
provided a presumptive definition that could be disregarded by 
demonstrating an alternative legislative intent.43 Justice Douglas 
wrote that the debate about the second version of the Sherman 
Amendment provided ample evidence that the legislature intended 
to use a narrower definition of the word "person" than the one re­
cently codified.44 
Justice Douglas's analysis did not hold up. In 1978, following a 
seventeen year assault on Monroe,45 the Supreme Court overruled 
Monroe's exclusion of municipal liability, in Monell v. Department 
of Social Services .46 In Monell, a group of female employees sued 
the school board and its chancellor, the Department of Social Ser­
vices along with its commissioner, and the City of New York for 
damages after they were forced to take medically unnecessary, un­
paid leave during pregnancy.47 The district court found that the 
policy of forced leave violated the plaintiffs' constitutional rights.48 
However, the court denied their claims for back pay because the 
City would have had to pay the damages and, as a municipality, the 
City was not liable under Monroe.49 The Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit affirmed, specifically holding that neither the City, 
the Department of Social Services, nor the Board of Education 
were "persons" who could be reached by § 1983.50 The Supreme 
Court reversed.51 
42. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 191 (1961); see also ch. 71, 16 Stat. 431, § 2 
("The word 'person' may extend and be applied to bodies politic and corporate."). 
43. See Monroe, 365 U.S. at 19l. 
44. Id. at 187-90. 
45. See, e.g., Karen M. Blum, From Monroe to Monell: Defining the Scope of 
Municipal Liability in Federal Courts, 51 TEMP. L. REV. 409, 412-14 (1978); see also 
infra note 217 and accompanying text. Some lower courts challenged Monroe either by 
recognizing the scholarly critique of Monroe, or by carving out exceptions to the gen­
eral rule against municipal liability articulated in Monroe. See, e.g., Carter v. Carlson, 
447 F.2d 358, 369-70 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (carving out an exception to the Monroe rule 
against municipal liability in the case of the District of Columbia); Hogge v. Hedrick, 
391 F. Supp. 91, 96 n. 3 (1975) (noting the scholarly criticism of the legislative history 
analysis that formed the basis of Monroe). 
46. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). 
47. Id. at 660-61. 
48. Id. at 661-62. The policy, in fact, had been changed while the litigation was 
pending. [d. 
49. [d. at 662. 
50. Id. 
51. [d. at 702. 
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Writing for the Court, Justice Brennan thoroughly reviewed 
the debate surrounding the Sherman Amendment and the wording 
eventually adopted in section 6 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871.52 
He concluded that the Monroe Court had incorrectly identified the 
concerns legislators had with the Sherman Amendment53 and that 
neither the debates about the Sherman Amendment nor those 
about § 1983 provided clear evidence that legislators intended to 
define "person" as excluding municipalities. 54 
Justice Brennan wrote in the first part of his opinion: "Our 
analysis of the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 
compels the conclusion that Congress did intend municipalities and 
other local government units to be included among those persons to 
whom § 1983 applies."55 Since the civil rights violations at issue in 
Monell resulted from a municipal policy, the Supreme Court re­
versed the lower courts' decisions not to award back pay.56 The 
Court's decision could have ended here and Monell would have 
opened the door for municipal liability in a wide range of contexts, 
including respondeat superior liability.57 Instead, in the second part 
of the opinion, Justice Brennan indicated that municipal liability for 
employee conduct should be limited to those acts that furthered "a 
government's policy or custom."58 
The importance of the dicta concerning the "policy or custom" 
requirement was unclear at the time Monell was decided because 
those terms were not defined.59 Monell did, however, eliminate a 
52. [d. at 665-83. 
53. [d. at 679. 
54. [d. at 688. 
55. [d. at 690. In his analysis, Justice Brennan noted that the definition of "per­
son" found in the Federal Dictionary Act should apply to § 1983 in part because the 
Federal Dictionary Act was "passed only months before the Civil Rights Act was 
passed." [d. at 688. 
56. [d. at 695. 
57. Respondeat superior is "[t]he doctrine holding an employer or principal liable 
for the employee's or agent's wrongful acts committed within the scope of the employ­
ment or agency." BLACK'S LAW DlcrJONARY, supra note 40, at 1338. Vicarious liabil­
ity is "[l]iability that a supervisory party (such as an employer) bears for the actionable 
conduct of a subordinate or associate (such as an employee) based on the relationship 
between the two parties" and includes respondeat superior liability. Id. at 934. 
58. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694. 
59. The Monell "policy or custom" test has come to mean that "municipalities 
may not be held vicariously liable for the conduct of municipal employees but rather 
can be held liable only when municipal policy is the moving force behind the violation." 
Jack M. Beermann, Municipal Responsibility for Constitutional Torts, 48 DEPAUL L. 
REV. 627, 627 (1998-99). While the rule may be restated relatively easily, it has resulted 
in "a highly complex body of interpretive law." Bd. of the County Comm'rs v. Brown, 
520 U.S. 397, 430 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting). Both the "policy or custom" test and 
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clear barrier to bringing a successful § 1983 claim against a munici­
pality. Using the definition of "person" appearing in the Federal 
Dictionary Act, the Court overruled Monroe and brought munici­
palities under the scope of § 1983. 
C. Enactment of the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act 
Six months after the Supreme Court decided Monell, upon the 
petition of Attorney General Francis X. Bellotti, members of the 
Massachusetts General Court introduced House Bill 3135 (H.R. 
3135), "to further regulate the protection of the civil rights of per­
sons in the Commonwealth."60 H.R. 3135 passed without debate or 
amendment by voice votes in the Senate and House of Representa­
tives.61 The governor signed the bill into law less than two weeks 
after it arrived on his desk.62 The bill added both civil remedies and 
criminal penalties for certain types of civil rights violations.63 Two 
civil remedies provided by the bill make up the Massachusetts Civil 
Rights Act. The first authorizes the Massachusetts attorney general 
to bring a civil suit for injunctive or other equitable relief 
"[w]henever any person or persons, whether or not acting under 
color of law, interfere by threats, intimidation or coercion, or at-
the Monell limitation on municipal liability have been criticized by Justices of the Su­
preme Court and in numerous law review articles. See, e.g., id. at 430-31 (Breyer, J., 
dissenting); id. at 430 (Souter, J., dissenting); Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 834 
(1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Beermann, supra; Stephen J. Shapiro, Public 
Officials' Qualified Immunity in Section 1983 Actions Under Harlow v. Fitzgerald and 
its Progeny: A Critical Analysis, 22 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 249 (1989); Blum, supra note 
45. Additionally, determining whether the "policy or custom" test applies in a particu­
lar case, by at least one estimate, saps significant resources from federal district courts. 
David F. Hamilton, The Importance and Overuse of Policy and Custom Claims: A View 
From One Trench, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 723, 724-25 (1998-99). Together, these factors 
indicate why Massachusetts plaintiffs would be significantly helped by inclusion of mu­
nicipalities within the MCRA. 
60. JOURNAL OF TIlE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF TIlE COMMONWEALTII OF 
MASSAcHUSETfS 1979, at 2856 (1979); Legislative Packet for 1979 Mass. Acts 915, 171st 
Gen. Court, Leg. Sess. (on file at the Massachusetts Archives) (copy on file with West­
ern New England Law Review). 
61. Id. Had there been any proposed amendments, debate, or a roll call vote, the 
published legislative history would contain references to the procedural processes in­
volved. Specifically, if there had been a roll call vote, the specific results would have 
been printed. The Senate passed H.R. 3135 on July 31, 1979, and the House of Repre­
sentatives passed H.R. 3135 on November 4, 1979. Id. 
62. Id. 
63. The bill had two sections: the first provided civil remedies through two 
amendments to chapter 12 of the Massachusetts General Laws, and the second pro­
vided criminal penalties through an amendment to chapter 265 of the Massachusetts 
General Laws. H.R. 3135. 
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tempt to interfere by threats, intimidation or coercion, with the ex­
ercise or enjoyment by any other person or persons of rights 
secured" under federal or state law.64 The second enables victims 
of the same type of conduct to sue the perpetrator directly.65 
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court stated in Batchelder 
v. Allied Stores Corp. that the legislature intended the MCRA to 
"provide enhanced protection of civil rights."66 Tracing the in­
tended reach of the MCRA is difficult because the legislative re­
cord does not include records of debates or discussions concerning 
the scope of the bil1.67 However, some information about the pur­
pose of H.R. 3135 and the response generated as the bill worked its 
way through the legislature survives in the Governor's File68 and 
the published record of the legislative action.69 
Among the materials in the Governor's File are three docu­
ments that provide the most authoritative information about the 
scope of H.R. 3135 intended by the attorney general.7o In a letter 
to two members of the General Court, Attorney General Bellotti 
stated the purpose of the bill in broad terms, writing that H.R. 3135 
was "a comprehensive bill to protect the civil rights and civilliber­
ties of persons in the Commonwealth."71 He described how the bill 
would address the needs of both the attorney general's office and 
individual victims by authorizing the attorney general to act, while 
allowing individuals to pursue justice for themselves.72 Robert H. 
Bohn, Jr., Chief of the Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Division of the 
Department of the Attorney General, reiterated those points in tes­
64. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 12, § 11H (2004). 
65. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 12, § 111 (2004). 
66. Batchelder v. Allied Stores Corp., 473 N.E.2d 1128, 1129-30 (Mass. 1985). For 
a discussion of Batchelder, see infra text accompanying notes 84-96. 
67. Legislative Packet for 1979 Mass. Acts 915, 171st Gen. Court, Leg. Sess. (on 
file at the Massachusetts Archives) (copy on file with Western New England Law Re­
view). The file contains the text of the bill, a listing of actions taken, brief statements 
from the Senate Committee on the Judiciary and the Senate Committee on Senate 
Ways and Means recommending passage, and a record of passage in both the House 
and the Senate. [d. 
68. Governor's File for 1979 Mass. Acts 915 (on file at the Massachusetts 
Archives). 
69. JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF 
MASSACHUSETTS 1979, at 2856 (1979). 
70. Governor's File for 1979 Mass. Acts 915. 
71. Letter from Francis X. Bellotti, Att'y Gen. of the Commonwealth of Mass., to 
Sen. Alan D. Sisitsky & Rep. Michael Flaherty, Joint Comm. on the Judiciary (Mar. 7, 
1979) (on file at the Massachusetts Archives in the Governor's File for 1979 Mass. Acts 
915) (copy on file with Western New England Law Review). 
72. Id. 
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timony before the Joint Committee on the Judiciary.73 Thomas R. 
Kiley, First Assistant Attorney General, echoed Bellotti and Bohn 
when he urged the governor to sign H.R. 3135 in a letter dated 
November 8,1979.74 
Also among the papers in the Governor's File are a number of 
letters urging adoption of H.R. 3135.75 These letters provide con­
temporary impressions of the purpose and reach of the language 
that became the MCRA and indicate that public debate about H.R. 
3135 included discussion of federal civil rights laws like § 1983.76 
Several letters supported the creation of a state civil cause of action 
to supplement federal law, not simply because the state law would 
reach private actors, but because the law would give victims access 
to state courts.77 The only letter urging the Governor to veto H.R. 
73. Robert H. Bohn, Jr., Chief of the Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Division of the 
Dep't of the Attorney Gen. of the Commonwealth of Mass., Testimony Regarding 
House Bill No. 3135 Before the Joint Comm. on the Judiciary (Mar. 7, 1979) (on file at 
the Massachusetts Archives in the Governor's File for 1979 Mass. Acts 915) (copy on 
file with Western New England Law Review). Bohn also explained that while it was 
important to provide the Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Division in the Department of the 
Attorney General specific authority to initiate court action to remedy or enjoin civil 
rights violations, the individual civil remedy was important to shifting some of the en­
forcement burden away from the Department. Id. 
74. Letter from Thomas R. Kiley, First Assistant Att'y Gen. of the Common­
wealth of Mass., to Neil Lynch, Counsel to the Governor 3 (Nov. 8, 1979) (on file at the 
Massachusetts Archives in the Governor's File for 1979 Mass. Acts 915) (copy on file 
with Western New England Law Review). 
75. Governor's File for 1979 Mass. Acts 915. Specifically, the Senate Committee 
on the Judiciary received letters supporting the bill from Greater Boston Legal Ser­
vices, the Civil Liberties Union of Massachusetts, and the League of Women Voters. 
Id. Thomas McGee, Speaker of the House of Representatives, received letters from 
Action for Boston Community Development, Massachusetts Federation of Teachers, 
the Superintendent of the Boston Public Schools, and the Boston Police (signed by both 
the mayor and police commissioner). Id. The Governor received letters from the Mas­
sachusetts Law Reform Institute, the Boston City Council (including a copy of a resolu­
tion in favor of the bill approved by the Boston City Council), and Action for Boston 
Community Development. Id. 
76. See generally Governor's File for 1979 Mass. Acts 915. 
77. See, e.g., Letter from Robert M. Coard, Exec. Dir., Action for Boston Cmty. 
Dev., to Thomas W. McGee, Speaker of the Mass. H. of Reps. (Aug. 6, 1979) (on file at 
the Massachusetts Archives in the Governor's File for 1979 Mass. Acts 915) (copy on 
file with Western New England Law Review) (supporting H.R. 3135 because it would 
enable poor people to seek redress in state rather than federal courts); Letter from Am. 
Jewish Congo to Gov. Edward J. King (Nov. 8, 1979) (on file at the Massachusetts 
Archives in the Governor's File for 1979 Mass. Acts 915) (copy on file with Western 
New England Law Review) (referring to federal civil rights proceedings as slow and 
cumbersome); Letter from Allan G. Rodgers, Dir., Mass. Law Reform Inst. to Gover­
nor's Legal Counsel (Nov. 9, 1979) (on file at the Massachusetts Archives in the Gover­
nor's File for 1979 Mass. Acts 915) (copy on file with Western New England Law 
Review) (noting the difficulties of litigating civil rights violations in federal court). 
853 2007] MUNICIPAL LIABILITY AND THE MCRA 
3135 also addressed the relationship between federal and state civil 
rights law, asserting that the adequacy of federal law made state 
legislation unnecessary. 78 
Other documents in the Governor's File indicate that the Gov­
ernor also evaluated H.R. 3135 in reference to federal civil rights 
law.79 The documents include an article by Justice Brennan urging 
states to adopt civil rights protections beyond those afforded by the 
federal government,80 the Fourteenth Amendment, 18 U.S.c. § 242, 
42 U.S.c. § 1983, and 42 U.S.c. § 2000a-5, and information on re­
cent Supreme Court cases.81 Taken together, these materials pro­
vide a snapshot of contemporary thoughts, inside and outside state 
government, that influenced the enactment of the MCRA and pro­
vided the basis for later judicial interpretation of its scope.82 
D. Judicial Interpretation of the MCRA 
Courts have interpreted the scope of the MCRA in cases in­
volving a number of related issues.83 Later cases have built on the 
earlier analyses, notably that of Batchelder v. Allied Stores Corp. 84 
Batchelder involved a request for attorney's fees pursuant to the 
MCRA85 by a plaintiff who had previously received declaratory re­
78. Letter from Katherine P. Healy, Vice Pres., Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc. to 
Gov. Edward J. King (Nov. 13, 1979) (on file at the Massachusetts Archives in the 
Governor's File for 1979 Mass. Acts 915) (copy on file with Western New England Law 
Review) (urging veto because federal laws were adequate and state law, as drafted, was 
unconstitutionally broad). 
79. See Governor's File for 1979 Mass. Acts 915. 
80. William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual 
Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977). 
81. Governor's File for 1979 Mass. Acts 915. 
82. Batchelder v. Allied Stores Corp., 473 N.E.2d 1128, 1129-30 (Mass. 1985) (cit­
ing Governor's File for 1979 Mass. Acts 915) ("The Legislature passed this statute to 
respond to a need for civil rights protection under State law."). 
83. See, e.g., Duarte v. Healy, 537 N.E.2d 1230 (Mass. 1989) (addressing whether 
the MCRA implicitly incorporated qualified immunity modeled on federal qualified 
immunity (yes)); Chicopee Lions Club v. Dist. Att'y for Hampden Dist., 485 N.E.2d 673 
(Mass. 1985) (addressing whether MCRA includes absolute prosecutorial immunity 
(yes)); Sarvis v. Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 711 N.E.2d 911 (Mass. App. Ct. 1999) 
(addressing whether the MCRA holds private employers liable for employees' civil 
rights based on respondeat superior liability (yes)). 
84. Batchelder, 473 N.E.2d at 1128, cited with approval in Bally v. Ne. Univ., 532 
N.E.2d 49 (Mass. 1989); Duarte, 537 N.E.2d 1230; Sarvis, 711 N.E.2d 911; Howcroft v. 
City of Peabody, 747 N.E.2d 729 (Mass. App. Ct. 2001). 
85. Chapter 12, section 111 of the Massachusetts General Laws provides individu­
als with a right to bring private actions seeking remedies for the civil rights violations 
described in that section. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 12, § 111 (2004). In addition to author­
izing such actions, section 111 provides that "[a]ny aggrieved person or persons who 
prevail in an action ... shall be entitled to an award of the costs of the litigation and 
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lief on state constitutional grounds.86 The trial court denied the 
plaintiff's request for attorney's fees because the judgment for the 
plaintiff was only based on constitutional grounds, not on the 
MCRA claim.87 The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, ruling that 
the definition of "prevail" used in the MCRA has its source in 42 
U.S.c. § 1988.88 
Based on the legislative history and wording of the MCRA, the 
Batchelder court asserted that the MCRA was modeled after 
§ 1983.89 As a result, the court concluded, interpretations of terms 
and ambiguities in the federal law should be applied to the 
MCRA.90 The court also wrote that, following canons of construc­
tion, the MCRA, like other civil rights statutes, should be construed 
broadly to reflect the remedial intent of the legislature.91 Thus, 
Batchelder identified two guides for determining the scope of the 
MCRA.92 First, courts could look to federal civil rights laws be­
cause the private remedy authorized by the MCRA was meant to 
be "coextensive" with § 1983, except that the MCRA also applies to 
reasonable attorney's fees in an amount to be fixed by the court." Id.; see also supra 
text accompanying notes 64-65. 
86. Batchelder, 473 N.E.2d at 1128; see also Batchelder v. Allied Stores Int'l, Inc., 
445 N.E.2d 590, 590-91 (Mass. 1983). The plaintiff in Batchelder filed suit after a private 
security guard at a private mall told him he was not permitted to solicit signatures and 
distribute leaflets in support of his candidacy for Congress. Batchelder, 445 N.E.2d at 
591. In his suit, Batchelder alleged that the security guard's actions violated his rights 
under both the MCRA and the Massachusetts state constitution. Id. at 590-91. Batch­
elder sought a declaratory judgment that he had a right to solicit signatures and dis­
tribute literature in the mall. Id. at 591. The lower court denied relief and Batchelder 
appealed. Id. The Supreme Judicial Court granted Batchelder declaratory relief solely 
on constitutional grounds. Id. at 590-91. The court was only considering a request for 
declaratory relief at that time so it did not need to consider whether the MCRA would 
have provided grounds for additional relief. Id. at 591 n.2. 
87. Batchelder, 473 N.E.2d at 1129. 
88. /d. at 1130. The relationship between 42 U.S.c. § 1988 and 42 U.S.c. § 1983 
is analogous to the relationship between chapter 12, section 111 and section 11H of the 
Massachusetts General Laws, in that § 1988, like section 111, establishes a right to attor­
neys' fees for plaintiffs who successfully pursue claims under the associated section. 
89. Id. at 1128-30. "[T]he Legislature intended to provide a remedy under [chap­
ter 12, section 111 of the Massachusetts General Laws], coextensive with 42 U.S.c. 
§ 1983, except that the Federal statute requires State action whereas its State counter­
part does not." Id. at 1131 (citation omitted); see also Lyons v. Nat'l Car Rental Sys., 
Inc., 30 F.3d 240, 246 (1st Cir. 1994), overruled by Sarvis, 711 N.E.2d 911 (refusing to 
permit MCRA liability based on respondeat superior because MCRA mirrors § 1983 
under which respondeat superior is not a basis for liability); Chaabouni v. City of Bos­
ton, 133 F. Supp. 2d 93,100-01 (D. Mass. 2001) (citing to Batchelder for the proposition 
that the MCRA and § 1983 provide similar protections). 
90. Batchelder, 473 N.E.2d at 1130. 
91. Id. at 1130-31. 
92. Id. 
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private actors.93 Second, courts could construe the terms of the 
MCRA broadly because the MCRA, like other civil rights statutes, 
was remedial in nature.94 In Batchelder, both interpretive ap­
proaches led to the same outcome.95 By adopting the federal defi­
nition of "prevail," the court also provided a liberal interpretation 
of that term in the MCRA.96 However, later cases have shown that 
adopting interpretations from federal civil rights law can sometimes 
conflict with a liberal interpretation of the MCRA.97 
In Duarte v. Healy, the Supreme Judicial Court advanced the 
view that § 1983 case law should apply to the MCRA.98 In Duarte, 
the plaintiff, a former firefighter, sought damages from the city 
manager and fire chief who ordered drug testing that violated his 
civil rights.99 The Supreme Judicial Court determined that the qual­
ified immunity for discretionary functions1OO enjoyed by public em­
93. Id. at 1131. Additionally, as the court noted, the MCRA contains a require· 
ment that any actionable interference with a person's civil rights be "by threats, intimi­
dation or coercion, or attempt to interfere by threats, intimidation or coercion." MASS. 
GEN. LAWS ch. 12, § 11H (2004). Section 1983 does not contain such a requirement. 42 
U.S.c. § 1983 (2000). 
94. Batchelder, 473 N.E.2d at 1130-31. 
95. Id. 
96. Id. (allowing plaintiff to recover attorneys' fees by adopting the definition of 
"prevail" from 42 U.S.c. § 1983). 
97. Compare Duarte v. Healy, 537 N.E.2d 1230 (Mass. 1989) (dismissing com­
plaint because Massachusetts legislature intended to import federal concept of qualified 
immunity in the MCRA, even though the text mentions no immunities and such immu­
nities limit victims' ability to recover damages), with Sarvis v. Boston Safe Deposit & 
Trust Co., 711 N.E.2d 911 (Mass. App. Ct. 1999) (allowing plaintiff to recover because 
Massachusetts legislature intended private employers to be subject to respondeat supe­
rior liability for employees' violations even though employers are not subject to respon­
deat superior liability under § 1983). 
98. Duarte, 537 N.E.2d 1230. 
99. Id. at 1231-32. 
100. At common law, various governmental officials enjoyed different levels of 
immunity from liability for actions carried out while working. Charles R. Wilson, "Lo­
cation, Location, Location": Recent Developments in the Qualified Immunity Defense, 
57 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 445, 449-50 (2000). Though § 1983 contains no mention 
of immunity for governmental actors, the Supreme Court has incorporated the concept 
into § 1983 jurisprudence since 1967. Id. (citing Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967)). 
The idea that government employees should be immune from liability for most discre­
tionary actions, which are those actions that are within the scope of employment but 
not clearly required, was later reaffirmed. Id. (citing Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 
(1975)). The rationale for such immunity is that government employees should gener­
ally be free to use discretion in carrying out job functions without fear of liability. Id. 
The defense is unavailable to government employees who act maliciously in violating a 
person's rights or where the rights violated have been "clearly established." Id. A 
more detailed discussion of the concept of qualified immunity for discretionary func­
tions is beyond the scope of this Note. For a further discussion of immunity under 
§ 1983, see id. at 449-55. 
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ployees under § 1983 applied equally to the MCRA.IOl Presuming 
the legislature was aware of the case law establishing qualified im­
munity under § 1983, the Supreme Judicial Court ruled that by pat­
terning the MCRA on § 1983, the legislature intended to adopt 
analogous immunity, even though the language of the MCRA does 
not mention immunities.102 
The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit fol­
lowed the Duarte reasoning in Lyons v. National Car Rental Sys­
tems, Inc.103 There the court rejected a claim against a private 
employer based on respondeat superior liability because Monell, 
which predated the MCRA, had also rejected respondeat superior 
liability.104 The First Circuit ruled that Monell applied equally to 
private employers because the ruling addressed "the language and 
legislative history of section 1983, not .. , principles-such as sov­
ereign or qualified immunity-applicable only to governmental en­
tities."lo5 The court said that because the state legislators who 
adopted the MCRA modeled it on § 1983, they intended to follow 
Monell and reject respondeat superior liability.106 
In 1999, the Massachusetts Appeals Court rejected the federal 
court's Lyons reasoning in Sarvis v. Boston Safe Deposit & Trust 
CO.107 Sarvis involved a suit by the children of a man who de­
faulted on the mortgage of their home.108 An affiliate of the bank 
obtained the home at a foreclosure sale and employees of the bank 
took actions to sell the house.109 The bank did not, however, take 
101. Duarte, 537 N.E.2d at 1232 (citing Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975), 
as the source of qualified immunity under § 1983). 
102. Id. Indeed this paralleled the process in the Supreme Court where the com­
mon law immunity doctrine was grafted onto § 1983 despite the absence of any mention 
of immunity in § 1983. Wilson, supra note 100, at 449-50. 
103. Lyons v. Nat'l Car Rental Sys., Inc., 30 F.3d 240 (1st Cir. 1994) (applying 
Massachusetts law in a diversity case that included a claim under the MCRA). 
104. Id. at 246. 
105. Id. at 246-47. The court recognized that the Monell discussion of the legisla­
tive history of § 1983 explicitly applied only to governmental entities. Id. However, the 
court said that the Monell reading of the legislative history of § 1983 showed "that 
Congress declined to make municipalities vicariously liable under § 1983, despite argu­
ments that vicarious liability would reduce the incidence of unconstitutional acts and 
would spread the cost of injuries throughout the community." Id. According to the 
court, such a rejection indicated an unwillingness to hold employers liable and spread 
liability costs, concerns equally applicable to private employers. Id.; see also Monell v. 
Dep't of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 693-94 (1978). 
106. Lyons, 30 F.3d at 246. 
107. Sarvis v. Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 711 N.E.2d 911, 920-21 (Mass. 
App. Ct. 1999). 
108. Id. at 915. 
109. Id. 
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proper steps to evict the plaintiffs from the home.110 Instead of in­
stituting summary process proceedings against the plaintiffs, an em­
ployee of the bank and a real estate agent hired by the bank took 
various steps to cause the plaintiffs to vacate the house, including 
having the locks changed, charging the plaintiffs with trespassing, 
sending cleaning personnel to remove the plaintiffs' belongings, and 
threatening the plaintiffs with arrest.lll 
The Sarvis court allowed the plaintiffs to recover damages 
from the bank, holding that the bank was vicariously liable for the 
acts its employee and real estate agent carried out in its service.112 
The court explicitly found that the MCRA had a broad remedial 
purpose and, as a result, should receive a "liberal construction. "113 
In this case, that meant permitting respondeat superior liability, 
even though it would conflict with § 1983 case law predating the 
MCRA. Rather than framing the issue as whether the legislature 
intended to incorporate the Monell limit on vicarious liability, the 
court asked whether the legislature intended to exclude liability 
long established under the common law, even as it introduced a 
new remedy.114 The court justified applying the established com­
mon law to the MCRA because expanding the reach of the MCRA 
was consistent with its remedial purpose.115 
In addition to relying on the established nature of respondeat 
superior liability in Massachusetts and the remedial intent of the 
legislature, the court based its decision on the actual language of 
the statute.H6 The court focused on the application of the MCRA 
to "persons."117 Like the federal government, Massachusetts de­
fines words commonly appearing in legislation in a "dictionary" 
statute (hereinafter MDS).118 According to the preamble of the 
110. Id. 915-16. 
111. Id. 
112. Id. at 920-21. 
113. Id. 
114. See id. 
115. Id. 
116. Id. at 920. 
117. Id. 
118. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 4, § 7 (2004). The abbreviation "MDS" for "Massa­
chusetts dictionary statute" is used here for simplicity, though the statute itself does not 
have an official title. The MDS was first codified in its current form and location in 
1921. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 4, § 7 (1921). In using the definition from the MDS to guide 
interpretation of a term in the MCRA, the court was making an argument similar to 
that made by Justice Brennan in Monell, that the Federal Dictionary Act should be the 
source of the meaning of the word "person" as used in § 1983. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. 
Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 688-89 (1978). While Justice Brennan emphasized the 
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MDS, the defined terms "shall have the meanings [therein] given, 
unless a contrary intention clearly appears."119 Since 1921 the MDS 
has provided that" '[p]erson' or 'whoever' shall include corpora­
tions, societies, associations and partnerships. "120 According to the 
court in Sarvis, the MDS establishes that the MCRA applies to cor­
porations (and societies, associations, and partnerships) even 
though they can act only through their agents.121 Without respon­
deat superior liability, the MCRA would apply to corporations and 
yet be unable to reach them.122 To prevent this frustration of the 
MCRA, the court concluded that private employers were subject to 
respondeat superior liability for their employees' MCRA 
violations.123 
Sarvis directly addressed only private employers.124 However, 
in a footnote the court suggested public employers might not be 
subject to respondeat superior liability under the MCRA because 
"person" has not "ordinarily be[en] construed to include the State 
or political subdivisions thereof. "125 Sarvis was not the first case to 
ask whether the MCRA applies to municipalities. In 1996, the Su­
preme Judicial Court explicitly declined to decide the question in 
Swanset Development Corp. v. City of Taunton. 126 Writing for the 
court, Justice Greaney explained that the court had transferred the 
case "principally to consider whether a municipality should be con­
sidered a 'person' for the purposes of liability under the [MCRA]," 
but, because the issue had not been adequately briefed, the court 
declined to decide the questionP7 Since Swanset, the Supreme Ju­
dicial Court has not addressed the issue; however, in 2001 both the 
United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts and 
the Massachusetts Appeals Court held that municipalities are not 
"persons" subject to liability under the MCRA.128 
temporal proximity of the passage of the Federal Dictionary Act and § 1983, the Massa­
chusetts court glossed over the many years that separated the passage of the MDS defi­
nition of "person" from the enactment of the MCRA. Id.; Sarvis, 711 N.E.2d at 920. 
119. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 4, § 7 (emphasis added). 
120. Id. d. 23. 
121. Sarvis, 711 N.E.2d at 920. 
122. Id. 
123. Id. at 920-2l. 
124. Id. 
125. Id. at 920 n.lO. 
126. Swan set Dev. Corp. v. City of T::unton, 668 N.E.2d 333, 334 (Mass. 1996). 
127. Id. 
128. Chaabouni v. City of Boston, 133 F. Supp. 2d 93, 102-03 (D. Mass. 2001); 
Howcroft v. City of Peabody, 747 N.E.2d 729, 744 (Mass. App. Ct. 2001). 
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The United States District Court for the District of Massachu­
setts, in deciding Chaabouni v. City ofBoston, dismissed an MCRA 
claim against the City of Boston, finding that it was not a "person" 
for the purposes of the MCRA.129 The plaintiff in Chaabouni filed 
suit after several city police officers allegedly violated his constitu­
tional rights during a traffic stop.130 He sought to recover damages 
from the city under both § 1983 and the MCRA.l3l The court dis­
missed his § 1983 claim for failure to allege that his injury was re­
lated to an unconstitutional official policy or custom.132 Based on 
the § 1983 dismissal, the City argued the MCRA claim should also 
be dismissed because the MCRA and § 1983 "'are parallel statutes, 
coextensive with each other.' "133 
The court found the City's argument "facially appealing," but 
"fundamentally flawed,"134 noting significant differences between 
§ 1983 and the MCRA.B5 According to the court, Sarvis added to 
these differences when it rejected the use of the "custom or policy" 
test in the case of private employers.136 Although Sarvis undercut 
the city's argument, it was also the basis for the court's dismissal of 
the claims against the city because the city is not a "person" under 
the MCRA.137 The court relied on the Sarvis holding that the MDS 
definition of "person" applies to the MCRA and Sarvis dicta sug­
gesting that "person" does not include municipal corporations.138 
As noted above, the MDS definition of "person" includes cor­
porations, societies, associations, and partnerships.139 Massachu­
setts courts have generally held that the word "corporation" as used 
in the definition of "person" and "whoever" does not encompass 
129. Chaabouni, 133 F. Supp. 2d at 93, 103. 
130. Id. at 94-95. In his complaint, the plaintiff alleged that city police officers 
"pulled him from his vehicle and proceeded to handcuff, assault, and beat him." Id. at 
94. Plaintiffs complaint included five counts. Id. at 94-95. This Note only addresses 
the court's analysis of the fifth count in which plaintiff alleged his State and Federal civil 
rights were violated. Id. at 99-103. 
131. Id. 
132. Id. at 99. 
133. Id. at 101 (quoting Canney v. City of Chelsea, 925 F. Supp. 58, 68 (D. Mass. 
1996)). 
134. Id. 
135. Id. As the court noted, the MCRA applies to private actors and applies only 
where the civil rights violation involves "threats, intimidation, or coercion." Id. 
136. Id. 
137. Id. at 101-03. 
138. Id. at 101-02. 
139. See supra text accompanying notes 118-121. 
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municipal corporations.14o The words "corporation" and "person" 
as used in other statutes have also been found to exclude municipal 
corporations, despite the text of the MDS.141 
One exception to this rule occurred when the Supreme Judicial 
Court decided Attorney General v. City of Woburn. 142 In Woburn, 
the court held that the Department of Public Health could fine the 
City pursuant to a law that applied to "[w]hoever permits the en­
trance or discharge into any part of the ... river ... of sewage or of 
any other substance injurious to public health or tending to create a 
public nuisance. "143 The statute did not explicitly include govern­
ment entities or municipalities among the entities defined by "who­
ever," yet the court held that the statute must be read to include 
municipalities because to do otherwise would frustrate the purpose 
of the statute. l44 
Without mentioning Woburn, the Chaabouni court adopted 
the Sarvis conclusion that "[t]here is nothing in the MCRA to indi­
cate clearly that the legislature did not intend the term 'person' to 
take on the statutory definition appearing in [the MDS]."145 The 
court observed that if the legislature intended the MCRA to abro­
gate common law sovereign immunity for municipalities, it would 
have used explicit language to indicate its intent.146 
140. Commonwealth v. Voight, 556 N.E.2d 115, 116-17 (Mass. App. Ct. 1990) 
(holding that the legislature's inclusion of corporations as "persons" does not extend to 
municipal corporations); see also City of New Bedford v. New Bedford, Woods Hole, 
Martha's Vineyard, & Nantucket Steamship Auth., 107 N.E.2d 513, 517 (Mass. 1952) 
(stating that the statutory definition of "person" does not include municipalities); How­
ard v. Chicopee, 12 N.E.2d 106, 110 (Mass. 1938) (construing MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 4, 
§ 7 definition of "person" to exclude municipalities). But see Att'y Gen. v. City of 
Woburn, 79 N.E.2d 187 (Mass. 1948) (holding statute applied to municipal corporations 
despite use of the word "whoever" because excluding municipalities would undermine 
the purpose of the statute). 
141. O'Donnell v. N. Attleborough, 98 N.E. 1084, 1085-86 (Mass. 1912) (relying 
on history and organization of statutes to show that legislature distinguishes between 
"private or moneyed" from "public or municipal" corporations and that therefore "per­
son or corporation" does not include municipalities). 
142. City of Woburn, 79 N.E.2d 187. 
143. Id. at 188. 
144. Id. at 188-89. The purpose of the statute was to prevent pollution in the 
river, a purpose which could only be achieved if all parties, including municipalities, 
were prohibited from polluting the river. Id. 
145. Chaabouni v. City of Boston, 133 F. Supp. 2d 93, 102 (D. Mass. 2001) (quot­
ing Sarvis v. Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 711 N.E.2d 911, 921 (Mass. App. Ct. 
1999». 
146. Id. at 102-03. In its cursory discussion of the relationship between the 
MCRA and the "ancient protection of sovereign immunity," the court suggested that 
because there was a long tradition of common law sovereign immunity for municipali­
ties, any legislature wishing to abrogate that immunity would have done so quite explic­
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Several months after Chaabouni, the Massachusetts Appeals 
Court also concluded, in Howcroft v. City of Peabody, "that a mu­
nicipality is not a 'person' covered by the [MCRA]."147 The plain­
tiff in Howcroft was a former police officer in the City of 
Peabody.148 While employed as a police officer, the plaintiff sought 
to have state restrictions on smoking in public buildings enforced in 
the police station where he worked.149 The plaintiff's superiors did 
not respond to his legitimate complaints and instead retaliated by 
subjecting him to additional smoke in the workplace and wrongly 
punishing him for supposed abuse of sick leave policies.I50 Eventu­
ally, the plaintiff filed a four-count complaint against the city and 
the individual officers alleging violation of his civil rights under 
both § 1983 and the MCRA, intentional infliction of emotional dis­
tress, and intentional interference with advantageous relation­
ships.l51 The trial court allowed the defendants' motions for 
summary judgment on all counts. I52 On appeal, the court upheld 
the dismissal of all claims against the city and the officers in their 
official capacities, but reversed and remanded all claims against the 
officers in their individual capacities.153 
In its ruling, the Appeals Court first addressed the relationship 
between the municipal liability allowed under § 1983 and the 
MCRA.154 According to the court, municipalities are liable under 
§ 1983 because of the specific legislative history relating to its use of 
the word "person," including passage of the Federal Dictionary 
Act, as explained in Monell. I55 The court, however, did not adopt 
the § 1983 position.l56 Instead, it stated "[t]hat legislative history 
has no bearing on the MCRA" because the word "person" as de­
fined by the MDS does not apply to political subdivisions. I57 The 
itly. Id. Although the court discussed the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act, which largely 
abrogated that traditional sovereign immunity elsewhere in its opinion, it does not note 
the temporal proximity between the passage of the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act, in 
1977, and the MCRA, in 1979. 
147. Howcroft v. City of Peabody, 747 N.E.2d 729, 744 (Mass. App. Ct. 2001). 
148. Id. at 733. 
149. Id. at 733-39. 
150. Id. at 734-37. 
151. Id. at 733, 748. Specifically, Howcroft alleged "that his First Amendment 
right to speak out on a matter of public interest had been infringed." Id. 
152. Id. at 744. 
153. ld. at 733, 748. 
154. ld. at 744. 
155. ld.; see also supra note 55 and accompanying text. 
156. Howcroft, 747 N.E.2d at 744; see also supra note 55 and accompanying text. 
157. Howcroft, 747 N.E.2d at 744. 
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court concluded that the legislature would have used explicit lan­
guage if it intended the MCRA to apply to "persons" not defined as 
such in the MDS.158 
II. ANALYSIS 
Despite the conclusions of the Howcroft and Chaabouni 
courts, evidence suggests that the legislature intended municipali­
ties to be liable under the MCRA. The available legislative history 
indicates that the MCRA was viewed as a broad, remedial stat­
ute.159 Excluding municipal liability would frustrate that purpose, 
indicating that the legislature intended the word "person" to have a 
less restrictive definition than the one in the MDS.160 Additionally, 
the legislature modeled the MCRA after § 1983, indicating the in­
tent to reach the actors subject to § 1983 liability, including munici­
pal corporations, and those "not acting under color of law" who 
would be beyond the reach of § 1983.161 The introduction of the 
MCRA occurred shortly after the Supreme Court decided Mo­
nell.162 At that time, municipal corporations had been brought 
under the reach of § 1983, and subsequent cases had not yet limited 
the reach according to the "policy or custom" test.163 Together, the 
modeling and the timing further indicate the legislature'S intent to 
reach municipal corporations. Therefore, explicit language limiting 
common law sovereign immunity was unnecessary. For these rea­
sons, the MCRA should be recognized as applying to municipal 
corporations. 
158. Id. at 745. 
159. See supra Part I.C 
160. Not only would eliminating liability for municipal employers have reduced 
the effectiveness of the MCRA as a deterrent against future civil rights violations, it 
would have been out of step with recent changes to sovereign immunity in Massachu­
setts. In 1977, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court had abrogated the state's sov­
ereign immunity doctrine, opening the door to tort liability for government entities, 
including municipalities. Whitney v. City of Worcester, 366 N.E.2d 1210, 1220 (Mass. 
1977). The following year the Massachusetts legislature responded by enacting the 
Massachusetts Tort Claims Act, modeled on the Federal Tort Claims Act. Mark L. Van 
Valkenburgh, Note, Massachusetts General Laws Chapter 258, Section 10: Slouching To­
ward Sovereign Immunity, 29 NEW ENG. L. REv. 1079, 1092 (1995). Under the Massa­
chusetts Tort Claims Act, public employers became liable for certain actions of their 
employees for the first time in Massachusetts history. [d. 
161. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 12, § llH (2004). 
162. Monell was decided on June 6, 1978, and H.R. 3135 was introduced in Janu­
ary of 1979. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); JOURNAL OF 
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS 1979, 
at 2856 (1979). 
163. See infra notes 209-210 and accompanying text. 
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A. 	 AvaiLabLe LegisLative History Indicates Intent for MCRA to 
Include MunicipaL Liability 
Circulated copies of H.R. 3135, the bill that became the 
MCRA, bore the description "BILL for the protection of the civil 
rights of persons in the commonwealth."164 The description does 
not suggest that the protections are limited to violations by individ­
uals and private employers. The documents from the Department 
of the Attorney General are also silent as to the exclusion of munic­
ipalliability. 
As described above, the three documents from the Depart­
ment of the Attorney General include two letters and a transcript 
of testimony provided to the Joint Committee on the Judiciary be­
tween the writing of the two letters.165 The attorney general's views 
about the scope of H.R. 3135 are especially relevant because the 
attorney general petitioned for the bill.166 Additionally, at least 
some members of the legislature considered H.R. 3135 to be the 
"Attorney General's Civil Rights Bill."167 
In the earliest letter, dated March 7, 1979, Massachusetts At­
torney General Bellotti described the purpose of H.R. 3135 in a 
single sentence. He wrote: "If enacted, this bill would provide 
needed access to the courts and effective remedies in matters in­
164. H.R. 3135, 171st Gen. Court (Mass. 1979) (on file at the Massachusetts 
Archives in the Legislative Packet for 1979 Mass. Acts 915) (copy on file with Western 
New England Law Review). The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has recognized 
that the title of a bill can be considered when a court is interpreting a statute. Com­
monwealth v. Graham, 445 N.E.2d 1043, 1046 (Mass. 1983) ("While the title to an act 
cannot control the provisions of the statute, the title may be used for the purpose of 
ascertaining its proper limitations."); see also Lynn Teachers Union, Local 1037 v. Mass. 
Comm'n Against Discrim., 549 N.E.2d 97, 102 (Mass. 1990) (holding that a statute enti­
tled "An Act relative to the dismissal of certain persons from employment or the re­
fusal to employ such persons due to age" should not be applied to limit the protections 
available to victims of other types of discrimination). 
165. Letter from Francis X. Bellotti, Att'y Gen. of the Commonwealth of Mass., 
to Sen. Alan D. Sisitsky, & Rep. Michael Flaherty, Joint Comm. on the Judiciary, supra 
note 71, at 1; Robert H. Bohn, Jr., Chief of the Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Division of 
the Dep't of the Att'y Gen. of the Commonwealth of Mass., Testimony Regarding 
House Bill No. 3135 Before the Joint Comm. on the Judiciary, supra note 73, at 3; 
Letter from Thomas R. Kiley, First Assistant Att'y Gen. of the Commonwealth of 
Mass., to Neil Lynch, Counsel to the Gov., supra note 74, at 3. 
166. JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF 
MASSACHUSETTS 1979, at 2856. 
167. Memorandum from House Staff to Rep. Michael Flaherty, Chairman, Joint 
Comm. on the Judiciary (Nov. 16, 1979) (on file at the Massachusetts Archives in the 
Governor's File for 1979 Mass. Acts 915) (copy on file with Western New England Law 
Review) (referring to the bill as "House Bill No. 3135-Attorney General's Civil Rights 
Bill"). 
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volving deprivation of constitutional and statutory rights by persons 
acting under color of state law or otherwise."168 By using the 
phrase "persons acting under color of state law or otherwise," Bel­
lotti indicated that he expected H.R. 3135 to provide a remedy 
against both private parties and those acting in an official capacity. 
The phrase also implies a connection to § 1983, which uses similar 
language,169 and signals that H.R. 3135 would cover all persons sub­
ject to § 1983, as well as those acting in a purely private capacity 
who would not otherwise be subject to suit. Private actors who 
could not be reached under § 1983 are not singled out as the special 
targets of the proposed legislation.170 Instead, the attorney general 
emphasized that H.R. 3135 would supply his department something 
it lacked-specific authority to take either criminal or civil action to 
address civil rights violations.171 
Finally, he stressed that the deterrent effect H.R. 3135 would 
have if adopted.172 He argued that providing his department and 
victims of civil rights violations with" [s]pecific authority to institute 
suit would ... discourag[e] future similar violations by persons act­
ing under color of state law or otherwise. "173 If, as Bellotti sug­
gested at the end of his letter, H.R. 3135 was intended to deter 
those acting on their own and those acting in their official capaci­
ties, it seems reasonable that the bill would reach municipal em­
ployers. After all, unless municipalities were made liable for the 
tortious conduct of their employees, the municipality would have 
little incentive to provide the type of training and oversight neces­
sary to prevent future abusesp4 
That first letter was delivered to the legislature by Robert 
Bohn, Chief of the Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Division of the De­
partment of the Attorney General, who reiterated Bellotti's points 
in his testimony before the Joint Committee on the Judiciary on 
168. Letter from Francis X. Bellotti, Att'y Gen. of the Commonwealth of Mass., 
to Sen. Alan D. Sisitsky & Rep. Michael Flaherty, Joint Comm. on the Judiciary, supra 
note 71, at l. 
169. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) (using the phrase, "any person who, under color of 
any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State"). 
170. Id. 
171. /d. at 2. 
172. Id. 
173. Id. 
174. Note, Damage Remedies Against Municipalities for Constitutional Violations, 
89 HARV. L. REV. 922, 927 (1976) (arguing "[t]he threat of monetary judgments against 
governmental units may ... spur higher officials to design their hiring and training 
programs, disciplinary procedures, and internal rules so as to curb misconduct"). 
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March 7, 1979.115 Bohn concluded his testimony by suggesting that 
legislators consider two points in their deliberations.116 First, he 
pointed out that H.R. 3135 would provide the Civil Rights-Civil 
Liberties Division with specific authority and responsibility, some­
thing its employees had lacked since the division had been created 
by earlier legislation. l77 Second, Bohn noted that H.R. 3135 would 
not place all of the power and responsibility for enforcement on the 
Department of the Attorney General. 178 One of the main benefits 
of providing a private right of action, as Bohn saw it, was to leave 
the "Attorney General ... free to fulfill his statutory responsibility 
of representing state agencies."179 This wording is somewhat am­
biguous in that Bohn could have been referring to either the gen­
eral duties of the attorney general or the specific obligations the 
attorney general would have to represent state agencies in suits 
brought under the provisions of the MCRA. However, a similar 
phrase used in the department's second letter written in support of 
H.R. 3135 suggests that Bohn was speaking about the specific suits 
that might occur if H.R. 3135 were adopted.180 
The second letter, written in November 1979 by Thomas Kiley, 
the then-First Assistant Attorney General, was addressed to Neil 
Lynch, Counsel to the Governor.181 Kiley's letter responded to a 
request for the position of the Department of the Attorney General 
regarding H.R. 3135.182 The letter included language almost identi­
cal to that used by Bohn in his testimony.183 Like Bohn, Kiley indi­
cated that the attorney general had been unable to support earlier 
state civil rights bills because all enforcement was left to his depart­
ment.184 Kiley went further than either the attorney general or 
Bohn, emphasizing the importance of the provision of the bill that 
allowed private attorneys to bring suits, "thus leaving the Attorney 
General free to fulfill his statutory responsibility ... to represent 
state agencies should they be sued under the new statute for alleged 
175. Robert H. Bohn, Jr., Chief of the Civil Rights·Civil Liberties Division of the 
Dep't of the Att'y Gen. of the Commonwealth of Mass., Testimony Regarding House 
Bill No. 3135 Before the Joint Comm. on the Judiciary, supra note 73. 
176. Id. at 2. 
177. Id. at 3. 
178. Id. 
179. Id. 
180. See infra text accompanying notes 183-186. 
181. Letter from Thomas R. Kiley, First Assistant Att'y Gen. of the Common­
wealth of Mass., to Neil Lynch, Counsel to the Gov., supra note 74, at 1. 
182. Id. 
183. Id. 
184. Id. at 3. 
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civil rights violations.185 Here, Kiley explicitly referred to the re­
sponsibility of the attorney general to defend state agencies in cases 
brought under the proposed statute, not simply the attorney gen­
eral's routine obligations. 
As indicated by Kiley's phrasing, the scope of H.R. 3135 as 
envisioned by the attorney general included the possibility that suits 
would be filed against state agencies. Such suits would, of course, 
only be possible if the MCRA waived the protections of sovereign 
immunity. Since the sovereign immunity protection for municipali­
ties emanates from the power of the state, it seems unlikely that the 
state would choose to waive its own liability while leaving munici­
palities immune.186 Additionally, there is nothing in the statute to 
suggest that municipalities and the state should receive different 
treatment. Together, the documents from the Department of the 
Attorney General indicate that the sponsor of H.R. 3135 viewed the 
bill as providing a broad remedy to citizens whose rights had been 
violated. Such an intent is incompatible with the exclusion of mu­
nicipal liability. 
B. 	 Applying the MDS Definition of "Person" to the MCRA 
Would Improperly Frustrate the Purpose of the Statute 
The MDS does not require the use of its definition of "person" 
where the legislature clearly expresses a desire to use another defi­
nition.187 The text of the preamble specifies that the definitions set 
forth shall not apply if "a contrary intention clearly appears" in a 
statute.188 When a statute contains its own set of definitions or ex­
pressly adopts a definition from elsewhere, this standard is obvi­
ously met.189 Both Howcroft and Chaabouni treat the absence of 
specific language in the MCRA adopting a contrary definition as 
sufficient proof that the MDS definition, excluding municipal cor­
185. 	 [d. 
186. In Whitney v. City of Worcester, the court noted that forty-five states had at 
least partially eliminated immunity as a defense for municipalities, while thirty-seven 
states had limited or eliminated the defense for actions against those states. Whitney v. 
City of Worcester, 366 N.E.2d 1210, 1213 (Mass. 1977). Following Whitney, and shortly 
before the enactment of the MCRA, the Massachusetts legislature enacted the Massa­
chusetts Tort Claims Act, which partially eliminated the immunity defense for all public 
employers, a category that includes, amongst other entities, the state, counties, cities, 
and towns. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 258, §§ 1-11 (2004). 
187. 	 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 4, § 7, cl. 23. 
188. 	 [d. § 7. 
189. Cf Glass v. Glass, 157 N.E. 621, 622 (Mass. 1927) (disregarding the defini­
tion of "inhabitant" found in Mass. Gen. Laws c. 4, § 7 because the provisions of the 
relevant statute were controlling). 
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porations, should apply.190 However, the very purpose of the law 
suggests a contrary intention. 
The Woburn case demonstrates how the legislature can implic­
itly adopt a non-MDS definition. In that case, the state Depart­
ment of Public Health sought to enjoin the City of Woburn from 
polluting the Aberjona River and its tributaries.191 The Depart­
ment's asserted authority came from a statute that "authorized and 
directed" the Department of Public Health to prohibit the pollution 
of the Aberjona River and its tributaries and to fine "[w]hoever 
permits the entrance or discharge [of sewage] into any part of" the 
River.192 The statute did not explicitly include government entities 
or municipalities, yet the Supreme Judicial Court decided that the 
Department of Health could use the statute to compel a municipal­
ity to change its behavior.193 
In justifying its decision to read the statute as applying to mu­
nicipalities, the Supreme Judicial Court said: "Manifestly the pur­
pose of the legislation is the protection of public health. The 
attainment of this object would hardly be possible if cities and 
towns were free to ... [pollute] the river."194 The court found this 
intent even though the statute did not explicitly create liability for 
cities, towns, municipalities, municipal corporations, or governmen­
tal subdivisions.195 In fact, the word "whoever" provides the only 
indication of the parties that the law can reach.196 
The court based its holding in part on the fact that the statute 
used the word "whoever" rather than "persons. "197 This distinction 
is unimpressive, however, because the two words are defined to­
gether and identically in the MDS.198 Thus, the court's rationale 
that legislative intent could signal a different meaning than the one 
used in the MDS would have been equally applicable had the word 
"person" been used. Both "whoever" and "person" apply to the 
190. See supra text accompanying notes 145, 155-158. 
191. Att'y Gen. v. City of Woburn, 79 N.E.2d 187 (Mass. 1948). 
192. Id. at 188 n.2 (citing 1911 Mass. Acts 252). 
193. Id. at 189. 
194. Id. 
195. The full text of the statute (1911 Mass. Acts 252) appears in Attorney Gen­
eral v. City of Woburn. Id. at 188 n.2. 
196. Id. 
197. Id. at 189 (suggesting that had the statute referred to "persons," it would not 
have been less clear whether the statute was applicable to municipalities, but not find­
ing the use of the word "whoever" sufficient to determine that the statute did not apply 
to municipalities). 
198. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 4, § 7, cI. 23 (2004) ('''Person' or 'whoever' shall in­
clude corporations, societies, associations and partnerships."). 
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same entities, including corporations.199 Earlier cases involving the 
terms "person" and "corporation" were consistently interpreted as 
exclusive of municipalities.20o However, the Woburn court implied 
that other definitions could be legitimate, at least some of the 
time.201 
Indeed, there is a single substantive point underlying the 
court's finding that the statute "as a whole manifests an intention to 
include municipalities."202 The substantive argument is that 
"[c]ities and towns are quite as capable of causing the mischief 
which the statute is designed to prevent as are private persons and 
corporations.''203 Despite the absence of explicit statutory language 
including municipalities, the Woburn court looked to the whole 
purpose of the anti-dumping statute at issue in that case. Similarly, 
courts should look to the entire, remedial purpose of the MCRA 
and not apply the restrictive MDS definition of the word "person." 
The MCRA was enacted "for the protection of the civil rights 
of persons in the commonwealth."204 Its scope was not limited to 
private actors, as the phrase "whether or not acting under color of 
law" demonstrates.205 To exclude municipalities from liability 
under the MCRA would compromise the purpose of the statute in 
the same way that allowing the City of Woburn to continue dump­
ing would have frustrated the purpose of the anti-dumping stat­
199. Id. 
200. See, e.g., City of New Bedford v. New Bedford, Wood's Hole, Martha's Vine­
yard, & Nantucket Steamship Auth., 107 N.E.2d 513, 517 (Mass. 1952) (quoting 
O'Donnell v. N. Attleborough, 98 N.E. 1084 (Mass. 1912) for the proposition that regu­
lation of corporations does not extend to municipal corporations); Donahue v. City of 
Newburyport, 98 N.E. 1081 (Mass. 1912) (holding that the statute making "persons" 
liable for certain accidents did not extend liability to municipal corporations); 
O'Donnell v. N. Attleborough, 98 N.E. 1084, 1085 (Mass. 1912) ("It has been a general 
rule in our legislation that statutes passed for the regulation of the rights and liabilities 
of corporations are to be applied only to private or moneyed corporations and not to 
public or municipal corporations or quasi corporations."); Commonwealth v. Voight, 
556 N.E.2d 115 (Mass. App. Ct. 1990) (holding that plaintiff did not violate the statute 
criminalizing harassing phone calls because calls to a municipal emergency number 
were not made to a "person"). 
201. Att'y Gen. v. City of Woburn, 79 N.E.2d 187, 188-89 (Mass. 1948). Specifi­
cally, the court noted that the traditional approach was "usually" adopted, implying that 
sometimes municipalities are "persons" or "corporations." Id. 
202. Id. at 189. 
203. Id. 
204. H.R. No. 3135, 1979 Gen. Court (Mass. 1979) (on file at the Massachusetts 
Archives in the Legislative Packet for 1979 Mass. Acts 915) (copy on file with Western 
New England Law Review). 
205. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 12, § llH (2004). 
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ute.206 If the statute had not applied to Woburn, the city would 
have had little incentive to stop dumping waste and the river would 
have remained polluted, even if all private parties quit dumping. 
Similarly, if municipalities are relieved from liability under the 
MCRA, they will have less incentive to properly train and supervise 
their employees. As a result, the risk that an employee will un­
knowingly abuse her power or authority in violation of the civil 
rights of another will remain. 
C. 	 The Timing and Text of the MCRA Strongly Suggest the 
Legislature Intended the MCRA to Include 
Municipal Liability 
Massachusetts courts have repeatedly found that the MCRA 
was modeled on § 1983.207 In Batchelder, the Supreme Judicial 
Court "presumed" the legislature was "aware of the use and mean­
ing" of the term "prevail" in an analogous federal civil rights stat­
ute.208 Since the statute was modeled on § 1983 and the legislature 
knew about the federal meaning given to "prevail," the court as­
sumed that the legislature had intended to use the federal meaning 
in the MCRA.209 Four years later, in Duarte, the Supreme Judicial 
Court held that the legislature was aware of current § 1983 case law 
when it adopted the MCRA and therefore the contemporary 
"clearly established" § 1983 case law was incorporated into the 
MCRA.21O Batchelder and Duarte both assume that the legislature 
knew about the case law interpreting federal civil rights legislation 
and intended to incorporate that body of law into the MCRA.211 
Applying this assumption to the question of the intended meaning 
of th~ word "person" in the MCRA means finding that the legisla­
ture was aware of recent changes to the meaning of "person" as 
used in § 1983, and intended to adopt those changes in the MCRA. 
In June of 1978, approximately six months before H.R. 3135 
was introduced in the Massachusetts legislature, the Supreme Court 
206. City of Woburn, 79 N.E.2d at 189 (stating that the purpose of the statute at 
issue in that case, preventing pollution of the Aberjona River, would be frustrated if 
municipalities were free to continue polluting the river). 
207. See, e.g., Batchelder v. Allied Stores Corp., 473 N.E.2d 1128, 1131 (Mass. 
1985) (finding that the MCRA was "intended to provide a remedy ... coextensive with 
42 V.S.c. § 1983"); Duarte v. Healy, 537 N.E.2d 1230, 1232 (Mass. 1989) (finding the 
legislature "chose to pattern the [MCRA] after § 1983"). 
208. 	 Batchelder, 473 N.E.2d at 1130; see also 42 V.S.c. § 1988 (2000). 
209. 	 Batchelder, 473 N.E.2d at 1130. 
210. 	 Duarte, 537 N.E.2d at 1232. 
211. 	 See supra notes 89-94, 100-102 and accompanying text. 
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decided Monell, overruling Monroe to hold that municipalities 
were "persons" within the meaning of § 1983.212 The ability of 
plaintiffs to successfully sue cities was subsequently restricted by 
the requirement, introduced in Monell, that municipalities would be 
liable only to the extent of a "policy or custom."213 However, at the 
time H.R. 3135 was introduced, the scope of the "policy or custom" 
requirement articulated in Monell was not yet clear.214 Therefore, 
applying the assumptions made about the knowledge of the legisla­
ture in Batchelder and Duarte, it seems that the legislature was 
aware of the change and intended to incorporate it into the 
MCRA.215 
The import of the change wrought by Monell further supports 
the assumption that the legislature was aware of this particular as­
pect of the case law regarding § 1983 at the time they considered 
the MCRA.216 Monell came seventeen years after Monroe. During 
these seventeen years, the limits to plaintiff recovery caused by the 
restrictive definition of "person" adopted in Monroe were repeat­
edly challenged in the pages of law reviews,21? in courts,218 and even 
by state legislatures.219 
Plaintiffs continued to try to reach responsible municipali­
ties,220 and the case law evolved as parties and courts found a num­
ber of approaches to do so. One approach offered some courts a 
relatively clear way around the limitations on § 1983 articulated in 
212. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 701 (1978). 
213. Susanah M. Mead, 42 U.s.c. § 1983, Municipal Liability: The Monell Sketch 
Becomes a Distorted Picture, 65 N.C. L. REv. 517, 554-66 (1987) (discussing the extent 
to which the "policy or custom" test has impaired the ability of plaintiffs to bring suits 
and recover damages). 
214. Arthur D. Hellman, The Business of the Supreme Court Under the Judiciary 
Act of 1925: The Plenary Docket in the 1970's, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1711, 1760 n.188 
(1978) (viewing the Monell decision as allowing municipalities to be sued without clear 
restrictions); Michael J. Gerhardt, The Monell Legacy: Balancing Federalism Concerns 
and Municipal Accountability Under Section 1983, 62 S. CAL. L. REv. 539, 564 (1989) 
(discussing the initial confusion of lower courts about the significance of the "policy or 
custom" requirement articulated in Monell, because there was no statutory basis for the 
requirement). 
215. See supra text accompanying notes 88-93, 98-102. 
216. See supra text accompanying notes 45-59. 
217. E.g., Shapo, supra note 26, at 277; Don B. Kates, Jr. & J. Anthony Kouba, 
Liability of Public Entities Under Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act, 45 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 131,132 (1972); Ronald M. Levin, The Section 1983 Municipal Immunity Doctrine, 
65 GEO. L.J. 1483, 1483 (1977). 
218. See infra note 226. 
219. See infra note 223. 
220. Blum, supra note 45, at 414-20. 
871 2007] MUNICIPAL LIABILITY AND THE MCRA 
Monroe. 221 During the 1960s and 1970s, a number of states modi­
fied their common law rules of sovereign immunity to allow suits 
against municipalities, the state, or both.222 By 1971, seventeen 
states had acted to make local governments liable for the torts of 
their officials, and in another seven states municipalities were simi­
larly liable, though only to the extent of their insurance coverage.223 
Massachusetts eventually became part of this trend when, the year 
before the legislature passed the MCRA, the Massachusetts Tort 
Claims Act was adopted.224 Adoption of the Massachusetts Tort 
Claims Act suggests that the legislature was concerned with the 
harm done to its citizens by traditional sovereign immunity 
exclusions. 
Given the high profile of the restrictive definition of "person" 
advanced in Monroe, the legislators were likely to have known 
about the rejection and replacement of the definition in Monell as 
they considered the adoption of the MCRA. Although the Su­
preme Court supported its decision to overrule the Monroe defini­
tion of "person" with a thorough review of the relevant legislative 
history, the result ultimately served a pragmatic purpose, on its face 
improving the ability of § 1983 to protect citizens from civil rights 
violations.225 Given the intense criticism of the Monroe definition 
that preceded Monell, it is likely that the Massachusetts legislature 
intended to make cities liable under the MCRA. 
221. Note, Developing Governmental Liability Under 42 u.s.c. § 1983, 55 MINN. 
L. REV. 1201, 1218 (1971) [hereinafter Developing Governmental Liability]. The ap­
proach was not completely free of pitfalls. Reconciling § 1983, § 1988, and state law 
was analytically tricky because § 1983 had been interpreted as excluding liability and 
§ 1988 expressly allowed the incorporation of state law only where consistent with fed­
erallaw. /d. The courts that followed this approach essentially had to see the exclusion 
in § 1983 as a gap, rather than an intentional exclusion. Id. at 1218-19. 
222. Id. at 1216-17 n.75. 
223. Id. In Arizona, California, Hawaii, Iowa, Minnesota, Nevada, New York, 
North Carolina, Washington, and Wisconsin, both the state and the political subdivi­
sions were liable. Id. In Alaska, Florida, Illinois, Michigan, New Jersey, Oklahoma, 
and Virginia, only municipalities were liable. Id. at 1217. Legislatures imposed liability 
in California, Florida, Hawaii, Iowa, Minnesota, Oklahoma, Nevada, New York, North 
Carolina, Virginia, and Washington. Id. at 1216-17. In the other states-Arizona, Illi­
nois, Michigan, New Jersey, and Wisconsin-liability was imposed via judicial decision. 
Id. Additionally, statutes in Idaho, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Da­
kota, Vermont, and Wyoming made municipalities with insurance liable up to the 
amount of insurance coverage. Id. at 1217. 
224. 1978 Mass. Acts 842 (codified as amended at MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 
258, §§ 1-11 (2004». 
225. Eric Schnapper, Civil Rights Litigation After Monell, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 
213,213-15 (1979) (describing practicaiproblems with Monroe, including that the dam­
ages available were often inversely proportional to the seriousness of the violation). 
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The second approach was to bring a § 1983 action against the 
individual perpetrator and then join to it a claim, directly under the 
Constitution, against the municipality.226 Some courts in jurisdic­
tions that explicitly allowed suits against municipalities adopted a 
second approach, permitting recovery under state law in federal 
court.227 Courts using this approach read § 1983 together with 42 
U.S.c. § 1988.228 Under § 1988, state remedies must be applied 
where federal civil rights law lacks an appropriate remedy so long 
as the state's law furthers the purpose of federal civil rights law and 
is consistent with the Constitution and other federallaw.229 
CONCLUSION 
The decisions of the federal district court and Massachusetts 
Appeals Court that municipalities are not "persons" subject to lia­
bility under the MCRA avoid the issue of whether municipal corpo­
rations, like private employers, should be subject to respondeat 
superior liability. Instead, municipal corporations have limited lia­
bility under § 1983, and no liability under the MCRA. As a result, 
the reach of the MCRA is reduced, plaintiffs whose rights have 
been violated by municipal employees are less likely to recover ap­
propriate damages, and there is less incentive for cities and towns to 
try to prevent employee violations through training and discipline. 
Narrowing the scope of the MCRA in this way frustrates the pur­
pose of the law to provide a broad remedy for civil rights violations. 
Although the legislature did not explicitly reject the MDS defi­
nition of "person" that excludes municipalities from liability under 
the MCRA, the text of the bill and circumstances of its passage 
support a more inclusive definition. The asserted purpose of the 
statute, its resemblance to § 1983, and the timing of its introduction 
all indicate that the legislature meant for the MCRA to reach both 
private actors and those people who are liable under § 1983 be­
cause their actions were "under color" of state law.230 Therefore, 
the holdings of Howcroft and Chaabouni should be overturned and 
226. E.g., Brault v. Town of Milton, 527 F.2d 730, 732 (2d Cir. 1975); Hostrop v. 
Bd. of Junior Coli. Dist. No. 515, 523 F.2d 569 (7th Cir. 1975); Construction Indus. 
Ass'n v. City of Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975); Traylor v. City of Amarillo, 492 
F.2d 1156 (5th Cir. 1974). 
227. Developing Governmental Liability, supra note 221, at 1214-16. 
228. Id. at 1214. 
229. Id. at 1201-02, 1215-16. 
230. 42 U.S.c. § 1983 (2000); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 12, § llH (2004). 
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courts should expand on Sarvis231 so that all Massachusetts employ­
ers-including municipalities-are held liable under the MCRA for 
the acts of employees, thus increasing incentives for municipal cor­
porations to train employees to comply with the law. 
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